The promotion of the benign atom as an instrument of American foreign policy was important to scientists and policymakers alike who sought to win 'hearts and minds' in the early years of the Cold War. The distribution of radioisotopes to friendly nations for research and medicinal purposes in the late 1940s, was followed by Eisenhower's far more spectacular Atoms for Peace initiative announced at the United Nations in December 1953. This paper exposes the polyvalent significance of the diffusion first of radioisotopes and then of reactor technology, notably at the famous conference in Geneva in 1955, with particular emphasis on the role of scientists and their appeal to scientific internationalism to promote national scientific leadership. It is stressed that openness and security, sharing knowledge or technology and implementing regimes of surveillance, were two sides of the same coin.
3 all the material would be used "to provide abundant electrical energy in the powerstarved areas of the world'. In this way, the American President concluded, "the contributing powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind". Eisenhower's proposal was greeted with rapturous applause; the President himself was almost moved to tears.
Atoms for Peace was a polyvalent propaganda exercise. It was intended to distract attention away from Eisenhower's commitment to the use, expansion, improvement of increasingly lethal nuclear weapons. To banalize the bomb, NSC162/2, officially approved on 30 October 1953, affirmed that if attacked the US would regard nuclear weapons to be munitions like any other, to be used if the situation called for them. To satisfy his 'New Look' military doctrine, that shifted the burden of defense from manpower to nuclear power, Eisenhower was engaged in the most massive weapons buildup in US history. The explosive power of the bomb was equivalent to 15 megatons of TNT, over a thousand times the destructive force of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The yield was far greater than expected and, coupled with unfavorable winds, dispersed radioactive material over a far wider area than anticipated. Military personnel and equipment had to be rapidly evacuated along with native islanders, some of whom were exiled from their homes for several years. A Japanese tuna fishing boat, the Lucky Dragon, was about 80 nautical miles east of the Bikini atoll where the bomb was detonated and was caught in the path of 'Bravo's' fallout. For nearly three hours white radioactive ash rained down on the boat, causing nausea, skin irritation and hair loss among most of the 23 crew members (one of whom died in September). The ensuing domestic and international protest was vociferous. It seemed to confirm that thermonuclear weapons were not just militarily superfluous, as some had said, but also morally repugnant instruments of genocide that could destroy 1000 square miles in one blast, and whose use would undermine the moral authority and leadership of any power that dared to detonate them. At a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) shortly afterwards, on May 6, 1953, Eisenhower worried that 'Bravo' would lead the world "to 3 Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War. 1953 -1961. Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, 1989), 172 et seq. 5 think that we're skunks, saber-rattlers and warmongers". 4 
His Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles confirmed that the US's image was becoming increasingly tarnished among her European allies "because they are all insisting that we are so militaristic". 5 Three weeks later, at a meeting of the NSC on May 27, Eisenhower again expressed concern about "a future which contained nothing but more and more bombs". 6 Something had to be done to project a more positive image of the United States abroad, something that showed the world that a country that had mastered the power of the nucleus to unleash unimaginable destruction, could contain that power and use it for human betterment.
Atoms for Peace was the answer. It would dispel the dread of the nuclear in the population at large, and combine awe for the good that the atom could do with gratitude and respect for the US's determination, not to destroy the world, as the Soviets would have it, but to make it a better place for all to live in. The peaceful atom was a weapon of what Eisenhower called "psychological warfare". It would help win the "struggle for the minds and wills of men", the struggle to get them to grasp one fundamental truth, "That truth is that Americans want a world at peace, a world in which all peoples shall Galison and Bernstein, "In any Light", (cit. n. 4). 6 Galison and Bernstein, "In any Light", (cit. n. 4).
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have an opportunity for maximum individual development". 7 Eisenhower recruited C.D.
Jackson from Time Incorporated to get this truth across. In Jackson's view Atoms for Peace serve as a "direct challenge to the Soviets' near monopoly of 'peace' propaganda", just the thing the US needed to "go on the moral and ideological offensive against the Communists […], give it a bite and a punch which would really register on both sides of the Iron Curtain". 8 Atoms for Peace was not one, but an interconnected set of policy initiatives in the nuclear domain. Firstly, it was not an instrument for nuclear disarmament (as the Soviets were quick to point out), but a device to enhance American military supremacy. In planning for Eisenhower's proposal to the UN, his aides suggested that the amount of fissionable material to be donated to the atomic pool should be 'X' where "X could be fixed at a figure which we could handle from our stockpile, but which it would be difficult for the Soviets to match".
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In fact the US contribution increased steadily from 100kg to 40,000kg without jeopardizing the parallel build-up of a mighty atomic arsenal. If the Soviets matched that they would seriously deplete their military capacity; if they did not they would lose the propaganda war to their arch-rivals.
The Atoms for Peace proposal also dovetailed with steps being taken by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to pressure and immensely reluctant private sector to invest in a domestic civilian nuclear power program.
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Although the idea had been in the air since 1947, its implementation was far from straightforward. As late as the end of 1952 nuclear reactor technology was still a military secret (embodied most notably in the Navy's nuclear submarine) and a government monopoly. Little technological information was available in the public domain, the engineering challenges were substantial, there was no one best process for power generation, and economic prospects were dismal. Firms like General Electric and Westinghouse were unwilling to develop the technology without financial guarantees. The AEC tried to generate enthusiasm by supporting studies of possible designs by different firms, using information released to select groups of engineers and acquired at various official training programs. But lacking any sound economic rationale, another kind of argument was needed to cajole industry into civilian nuclear power. Cold war rivalry and psychological warfare provided that argument: the program was essential to maintain the US's international prestige and scientific and technological leadership.
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At a convention of electric utility companies in Power, 1945 -1975 (Cambridge, 1991 , chapter 3. 8 would build a full-scale 60kW demonstration Pressurized Water Reactor at Shippingport in Pennsylvania to show the way to industry, and to stimulate the private sector to invest in civilian nuclear power. Murray was a devout Roman Catholic determined to do all he could to combat atheistic communism.
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"For years", he proclaimed, "the splitting atom, packaged in weapons has been our main shield against the Barbarians -now, in addition it is to become a God-given instrument to do the constructive work of mankind". U.S.
News and World Report was enthusiastic. "An international race for supremacy has started. Britain, with one atomic-powered project, is in the race. Russia is probably starting. Now the U.S. is jumping in". 13 The development of a domestic civilian nuclear power industry, and the export of nuclear technology to foreign markets required that the extremely tight security restrictions embodied in the 1946 Atomic Energy Act be substantially relaxed. Three weeks before the President made his official proposal at the United Nations, the AEC sent two draft bills to this effect to the Bureau of the Budget. One broadened the legal base so as to enable private industry to develop nuclear technology; the other provided for a freer flow of information. The relaxation of security surrounding the civilian aspects of nuclear energy was a condition for the success of the third facet of the Atoms for Peace Plan: an international scientific conference on the "benign and peaceful uses of atomic energy". The idea was first mooted by AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss in Bermuda in December 1953: he thought "that an international conference might have propaganda value in winning worldwide support among scientists for the President's plan". Prizewinner, and chairman of the AEC's General Advisory Committee, it was decided that the meeting should rather eschew overt political and ideological issues and serve as "a real forum for the exchange of information in biology, medicine, basic science and engineering".
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In subsequent discussions in Europe, notably with Sir John Cockcroft in England, nuclear power reactors emerged as the main focus for the conference.
Representatives from Britain, Canada and the United States would present "papers of real substance on the technical aspects" of reactor construction, and many features of the 15 Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and War. 1953 -1961 technology, from the social and economic aspects of nuclear energy, to medical, biological and industrial uses of radio-isotopes, would be discussed. The British also suggested that there be an exhibition of nuclear information and equipment to serve both as a trade fair and to explain the complexities of reactors and their applications to potential clients and the general public. that, even if the content was not scientifically riveting the event was an outstanding scientific success in other ways. An (anonymous) columnist in the British New Scientist remarked at the time that the meeting, "which started out as if it was going to be a dull and almost formal affair, was suddenly brought to life after about three days by the discovery that it was becoming the most momentous scientific occasion the post war world had ever seen". In this situation, to know what others were doing the United States had to resort to indirect means of intelligence gathering. The "prime target" was, of course, the Soviet Union, but "other areas are also of major importance, first, because research and development results in those countries may contribute to our own scientific and technological advancement, and second, because such discoveries may become known to the Soviet Union and so be of potential use against this country".
25
Science Attachés located in US embassies abroad were supposed to bear the main burden of scientific intelligence gathering. The system had its limits, however, since they generally lacked any scientific credibility. In 1951 the program's scientific scope was expanded further. Researchers abroad were now also permitted to use the material in industry, and all domestically available isotopes except for tritium were made available to them. 30 The program owed its immense success to the Manhattan project. Shortly after the war the AEC decided that it could use the nuclear piles that had produced plutonium for the bomb as a source of radio-isotopes for biomedical research and therapeutic purposes. In the 1930s particle accelerators were used to produce 'artificially' radioactive substances. Piles rendered the cyclotrons obsolete. The AEC estimated that the reactors at Oak Ridge, for example, could produce 200 millicuries of carbon-14 in a few weeks for about $10,000; it would take 1000 cyclotrons, and operating costs of well 29 NARA, AEC Records, RG 326, E67A, Box 46, Folder 3, "Information for the Press and Radio," 2-1-50. This was also an invitation to press, radio and periodical representatives to visit the site. over $1 million, to do the same.
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As soon as the word was out that the laboratory was in the business of providing radio-isotopes for American scientists, domestic demand soared. By summer 1947 researchers and medical centers in the US and Hawaii had received more than 1000 shipments of 90 regularly available radioisotopes. 32 The AEC had also received almost a hundred inquiries from 28 foreign countries, 75% of them for radioisotopes for medical research and therapy. 33 Foreign researchers, notably in Europe, expected their requests to be met without difficulty. Before the war it was usual for them to receive isotopes for research from American cyclotron laboratories. The mechanism was formalized in the 1940s, when the cyclotron facility at Massachusetts Institute of Technology was given the task of providing most radio-isotopes to people who were not on the bomb project, including scientists abroad. The relocation of radio-isotope production from a university cyclotron to a pile in a national laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the immensely 31 Creager, "Tracing the Politics," (cit. n.30), 375. Foreign scientist found their requests for radio-isotopes deflected, pending a policy decision by the Commissioners. The AEC's main preoccupation was, of course, security. It was suggested that "some shipment abroad could fall into the hands of capable persons who wish to develop atomic weapons". 34 And even if the restricted variety and small quantities of isotopes that were under consideration could never be used to make a bomb, might they not indirectly strengthen the military capability of a foreign power? Surely, Commissioner Lewis Strauss pointed out, the isotopes "would be useful as tools in biological research, metallurgical research, petroleum chemistry, and other areas which are part of the warmaking potential of nations". democracy". In subsequent skirmishes he successfully contested the shipment of a small amount of Phosphorus-32 to the University of Helsinki on the grounds that it may fall into Soviet hands. He was also deeply concerned by a request from NATO-ally Norway for one millicurie of Iron-59 for metallurgical research, since it came from a military laboratory, and one member of the research team "could be described as a Communist".
The security roadblocks on the free circulation abroad of small quantities of 'civilian' radio-isotopes frustrated many European scientists, especially on the continent.
They desperately wanted to get back to research after the war. Their cities had been bombed, their laboratories had been destroyed or pillaged, and, with the population cold, miserable and short of basic necessities, their governments had far more important priorities than supporting scientific research. Scientists turned to the United States for material support. There was "a crying, insistent need" to restart the supply of isotopes that had halted since the war, one correspondent wrote in July 1947 after speaking to Niels Bohr: "even the bottle-washings we throw away can be used literally for months of research over there" (emphasis in the original).
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Without even the crumbs from the rich man's table Europeans felt resentful and rebuffed.
The frustration was that much more intense since for many on the continent the atom had a quite different significance to that which it held for their peers in America. In the United States 'atoms for peace' was haunted by atoms for war, which dwarfed it. As Spencer Weart has pointed out, the nuclear industry "dealt with uranium-235 and plutonium by the ton, while Atoms for Peace imagery relied upon a stock of isotopes that could have been stored in a closet". 37 Not so in much of Europe in the first years after the war. In countries whose scientists and governments had no interest in preparing for a third world war, but rather in rebuilding themselves on the ruins of the second, the atom was an opportunity, a symbol of modernity and a better world to come, nuclear power a promise for energy and independence. Hiroshima heralded the dawning of a new age.
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It was a (ghastly) scientific experiment that showed conclusively that scientists, given the resources and the social authority, could successfully harness the awesome power of the nucleus to constructive ends. To deny a few millicuries of radioactive iodine or phosphorus to European scientists on the grounds that they constituted a security risk was Some foreign scientists went "as far as to class us in somewhat the same light as Russia on scientific and political matters", wrote one American scientist "certainly not a flattering comparison but one cannot deny many of the facts brought out", wrote another. 41 The refusal to provide 'civilian' radio-isotopes to foreign researchers was generating hostility towards the US, was embarrassing American scientists in their dealings with European colleagues, and was breeding suspicion and distrust about US intentions in the nuclear field. In this context of deteriorating US-European scientific relationships, the circulation of select radio-isotopes for research and for therapeutic purposes, was imperative to win back 'hearts and minds'. American scientists were in favor of it. Four of the five AEC Commissioners (Strauss being the exception) were in favor of it. The State Department was in favor of it. Acting Secretary Richard Lovett enthused that "these valuable products of the United States atomic energy plants will now be available in the services of mankind and […], to this extent at least, we are able to advance towards the beneficient (sic) use of this new force. This initiative", Lovett added, "should promote harmony and good feeling among nations". That said, international scientific exchange not only redrew the boundary between the permissible and the off-limits. It was also essential to ensuring that that boundary was respected. In doing the 'decent' thing, in "restor[ing] the international fraternity of knowledge" (Lilienthal), one was also guaranteeing American scientists access to radioisotope research in foreign laboratories -and access was an insurance against abuse. The transparency that was intrinsic to international scientific exchange was also the means to monitor what the other was doing, to ensure that security was not being breached. The AEC put a complex set of procedures in place to ensure that benefactors did not abuse the radio-isotopes that they were given. The request had to be made officially through the State Department (rather than directly from one scientist to another), and complete transparency in terms of intended use and results were expected. The client had to provide the Commissioners with three copies of a report every six months on the progress of the work, which had to be published in the open scientific or technical literature if possible. Recipients also had to agree "that qualified scientists irrespective of nationality will be permitted to visit the institutions where the material will be used and to obtain information freely with respect to the purposes, methods and results of such use, in accordance with well-established scientific tradition". 44 Scientific internationalism opened doors and loosened tongues. It enabled US 'inspectors' to ensure that the radio-isotopes sent abroad were not being used for purposes for which they were not intended. It would benefit American science by contributing to the shared pool of knowledge and, by ensuring that US scientists had access to any major discoveries, enhanced "our national security, which depends on continued progress in the field". Finally it would strengthen American leadership and supremacy: "With its superior technological potential", the Commissioners favoring the with the full weight of Presidential authority behind it, the idea that nuclear science could be advanced, and foreign policy objectives could be promoted, without threatening, but actually enhancing, US national security, was already well-established. This is not to Access to world-wide deposits of uranium and thorium had to be assured. NATO members that had little experience with nuclear science, and few local skills for handling dangerous nuclear materials had to be familiarized with the techniques. Foreign bases had to be secured and an icon around which to rally pro-American sentiment had to be paraded. 51 Medhurst, "Atoms for Peace and Nuclear Hegemony," (cit. n.7), 588.
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Medhurst, "Atoms for Peace and Nuclear Hegemony," (cit. n.7), 581-586 stresses this point and notes that, immediately after the passage of the relaxed Atomic Energy Act of 1954, a new series of treaties for mutual defense were signed with NATO countries, loosening restrictions on armaments and nuclear facilities, and allowing West Germany to engage in atomic energy plans. Eisenhower saw these measures as essential to help NATO "evolve more effective defense plans concerning the use of atomic weapons than have heretofore been achieved", 586-7.
To secure these diverse US interests abroad, beginning in June 1955 the Eisenhower administration began to sign bilateral agreements with selected countries all over the world, undertaking to supply nuclear reactors for research, and sometimes for power generation. Typically, these research bilaterals provided the US partner with unclassified information on the design, construction, and experimental operation of nuclear reactors, as well up to 6kg at a time of uranium enriched to 20% uranium-235.
The first was signed with Turkey; other NATO members Greece and Portugal soon followed. Belgium, Argentina and Brazil, all major suppliers of uranium, were also among the earliest beneficiaries of the scheme. Franco's Spain (which signed a mutual military assistance agreement with the US in September 1953), and apartheid South Africa (whose gold mines were rich in uranium ore) were not forgotten. 
The 1955 Atoms for Peace Conference in Geneva
The first International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy opened at the United Nations' Palais des Nations in Geneva on August 8, 1955, a decade almost to the day after the first use of a nuclear weapon. The distinguished Indian nuclear physicist, Homi Bhabha, presided over the twelve-day meeting that was attended by over 1,400 delegates from 73 countries and by almost as many observers and by over 900 31 journalists. 55 Welcoming messages arrived from the heads of state of Britain, France, India, Switzerland and the United States. Eisenhower reaffirmed his pledge "to help find ways by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life".
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The United States delegation was the largest: 259 people of whom 183 were scientists. They appointed Laura Fermi, Enrico Fermi's widow, to write an official account of the American contribution to the planning and proceedings of the meeting.
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The British came second in terms of sheer size, followed by the Soviet Union: 78 official representatives, including physicists, engineers, students, government officials and "the usual KGB staffers". The conference was organized around three major themes: physics and atomic piles, chemistry, metallurgy and technology, and medicine, biology and radioactive isotopes. The United States delegation made a major effort to disseminate information about its nuclear reactors and their uses in biomedicine and agriculture. Of the 3000 scientific and technical papers published in the proceedings of the meeting, over 550
were from the US (selected from over 1000 submissions), and many of these were presented orally. Notwithstanding the limits imposed by security, full engineering details were provided on nuclear plants already operating or under construction in the country.
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The scientific papers were complemented by technical exhibits that were reserved for delegates until 4pm, when they were opened to the general public, and by a trade fair in downtown Geneva. The Soviet Union came to Geneva equally determined to capitalize on the benign atom for propaganda purposes, and to distract attention away from its military program:
"Let the atom be a worker, not a soldier", 64 as the slogan had it. They too were determined to demonstrate the success of their system, winning hearts and minds for the communist road. As Paul Josephson has put it, for the Soviet authorities 63 Fermi, Atoms for the World,(cit. n.57). 64 Josephson, Red Atom (cit. n.58), 3. the peaceful atom showed that a nation whose citizens had been illiterate and agrarian less than forty years earlier, had become a leading scientific and industrial power. The achievements of science and technology, with nuclear energy at its summit, were symbols of the legitimacy of the regime both to Soviet citizens and to citizens of the world. The peaceful atom also allowed the USSR to score points with the conquered countries of Eastern Europe […] each of whom had a nuclear program based on Soviet isotopes, technology, and training programs and, in part, its largesse. Those scientists who did attend were treated to a visit to the new power station.
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Notwithstanding superpower rivalry and mutual 'psychological warfare', the conference did apparently contribute to reducing public fear and political tension. It was widely reported in the press: ten of the twelve days of the conference made the first page of the New York Times. 68 Indeed the sight of scientists from rival power blocs and from different nations discussing (civilian) nuclear affairs ("It was not an unusual sight to see small groups having spirited conversations as they walked along the Rhone River at dusk" 69 ) must surely have impressed those who previously saw nuclear science and nuclear scientists as major threats to world peace. Vladimir Veksler, leading Soviet accelerator physicist described the meeting as having "moved public opinion" and as having "strengthened the atmosphere of mutual understanding and good will born in every country following the Four Power Conference in Geneva" that had ended just a few weeks before the scientific gathering. The newspaper devoted most of its coverage to atomic power, using both fission and fusion, describing the technology and materials required, and sharing the general optimism about the long-term prospects of atomic energy as a viable alternative to fossil fuels. 69 Report, "Background of the Geneva Conference," (cit. n.61), 7.
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Press Statement by Veksler, "Atom Conference 'Tremendous Success'", (cit. n.22).
The Four Power conference (Britain, France, US, USSR) opened in Geneva on July 18 control of atomic weapons, but it was generally felt that the scientific cooperation and openness that it had fostered would help remove political barriers to such controls.
Certainly US commentators felt it had enhanced Eisenhower's efforts to promote the international control of nuclear material through a new agency. An American report written after the meeting claimed that "as a focal point of nuclear cooperation, the International Atomic Energy Agency was given an enormous boost […] . Delegates began to realize that international cooperation through the Agency could now be placed on solid grounds".
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The need for an Agency to "serve regulatory and developmental purposes" was also strengthened by the realization that more than thirty countries were actually embarking on nuclear programs.
For the scientists, the conference provided access not only to new knowledge, but also to nuclear researchers on the other side of the Iron Curtain. As one commentator put it, "Many scientists from the East and West met for the first time. There were many luncheons, dinners, and serious discussions over coffee at the Palais des Nations […] lasting friendships were formed among these scientists". Soviet scientists were equally enthusiastic. Veksler "noted with satisfaction that the scientists of the world easily found and ended on July 23, 1955. The final communiqué encouraged the hope of international détente. Within weeks, and in the midst of the Atoms for Peace meeting, the Soviet Union announced that it would reduce its armed forces by 640,000 by the end of the year. 71 Report, "Background of the Geneva Conference," (cit. n.61), 1. a common language; the significance of this fact is inestimable". Veksler's 'impressed' western colleagues were not just stunned, but panicked, by Soviet achievements. They demanded that the US immediately take steps to ensure that they did not lose their lead over their communist rivals. Melvin Price, the Chairman of the Subcommittee of the US Congress's Joint Committee Atomic Energy that was responsible for research and development, drew the conclusion that America was not producing enough qualified scientists and engineers for both the peaceful and military atomic programs. "When the Committee attended the Geneva conference last summer", wrote price in March 1956, "it gained a firsthand impression of this alarming fact".
Immediate and strenuous measures were needed to resolve the situation: "at stake", said Price, "is not only our national defense and well-being but our ability to compete with the Soviets in the struggle for men's minds throughout the free world". 
Conclusion
In a paper published over thirty years ago, Paul Forman showed how scientific internationalism in Weimar Germany was an expression of deeply-felt nationalistic sentiments. He remarked that historically these two apparently contradictory allegiances were reconciled "through the eminently simple formula that the fame and honor which the scientist wins accrues also to his nation and patron". Forman goes on:
According to this classical conception -largely due to and propagandized by the scientists themselves -the contribution of science to national prestige is an automatic and inevitable byproduct of scientific achievement. It does not require a choice on the scientist's part between serving the interests of science and serving the interests of his nation, between behaving like a good scientist and behaving like a good patriot". 
